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ABSTRACT 
The present study examines the relationship between state electorate and state government 
political ideologies and state legislative responses to payday lending.  Payday lending is a form 
of short-term, high-interest credit (e.g., Graves, 2003; Karger, 2005), and components of states’ 
legislative responses toward payday lending regulation serve as dependent variables in this 
study. The internal determinants model serves as the policy innovation model, predicting the 
attributes of states that influence legislative responses to social constructs (Berry & Berry, 1999; 
Mohr, 1969).  People espousing liberal political ideology believe in using governmental 
intervention to ensure corporate social responsibility, while those adhering to a conservative 
political ideology do not (Walters, 1977). The author predicted negative associations between 
political ideologies and components of state legislative responses to payday lending indicating 
more regulation. This study found four modest, significant correlations: (1) Between the 
percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal and that state’s legislated maximum 
payday loan principle amount, (2) between the percentage of each state’s electorate identifying 
as conservative and that state’s legislated maximum payday loan principle amount, (3) between 
liberal state government political ideology and that state’s legislated maximum payday loan 
principle amount, and (4) between the percentage of each state’s electorate identifying  as liberal 
and that state’s legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rate.  No relationship 
was found between liberal electorate political ideology and state legislated maximum payday 
loan maturity terms or fee disclosure requirements; between conservative electorate political 
ideology and state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, state 
legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, or fee disclosure requirements; or between 
liberal state government political ideology and state legislated payday loan implied maximum 
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annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, or fee disclosure 
requirements. This suggests that the internal determinant, liberal political ideology, is associated 
with using government intervention to regulate the state legislated maximum payday loan 
principle amounts and state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates 
that payday loan consumers can be charged. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Social workers, such as such as the profession’s pioneer Jane Addams, have historically 
been concerned with economic inequality and its exacerbation of poverty (Lundblad, 1995; 
Martin, 2012). Jane Addams both denounced the citizenry’s apathy toward changing social 
conditions that exacerbated poverty and led large-scale settlement house advocacy efforts for 
social welfare policies to reverse the adverse impact of poverty (Lundblad, 1995; Martin, 2012). 
Because social workers have historically been (Lundberg, 1995; Martin, 2012) and should 
presently be engaged in policy change efforts to reduce the adverse impact of poverty (Karger, 
1990), payday lending serves as a contemporary example of a social construct of economic 
inequality that exacerbates poverty (Karger, 2004, 2005; Melzer, 2011). 
People in poverty often have few resources and a lack of access to inexpensive credit, and 
this could pose a problem in the event that they cannot make monthly ends meet (Sapir & 
Uhlich, 2003).  A possible solution to this problem for those of the working class (Karger, 2005; 
Stegman, 2001) or the middle class (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001) is the payday loan (e.g., 
Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001; Karger, 2005; Sapir & Uhlich, 2003). 
Payday loans are short-term, high-interest, small-dollar credit extensions for funds 
(Karger, 2005). Generally, these loans mature at 2 weeks following the loan’s origination 
(Karger, 2005), and the maximum loan principles amount to totals ranging from a low of $300 in 
California and Montana to a high of $700 in the state of Washington (Pendus, Kuehn, & Brash, 
2010). Borrowers do not receive payday loans free-of-charge (e.g., Graves, 2003); the interest 
charges incurred for this form of credit usually amount to approximately $15 per $100 of the 
principle (Stegman & Faris, 2003). At the origination of the payday loan, the borrower writes a 
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post-dated check payable to the payday loan lender in the sum of the principle and interest 
charges (Karger, 2005). 
The borrower encounters several repayment alternatives at the maturity of the payday 
loan. Such alternatives include using the post-dated check for repayment of the loan in full, or 
alternatively defaulting and subjecting the loan to a collection agency or extending the original 2-
week payday loan maturation period by subsequent 2-week periods and remitting a service 
charge—typically $45—to the payday lender for each extension (Ernst, Farris, & King, 2004; 
Karger, 2005).  The latter alternative is known as a payday loan rollover (Graves, 2003) or 
renewal (Stegman, 2007).  Nonsufficient funds (NSF) fees on delinquent checks, compounded 
interest charges on subsequent payday loans, collection agency charges, and new customer fees 
ranging between $10 and $15 serve as just a few examples of fees encountered with a rollover 
(Karger, 2005).  Such fees and interest charges fuel the profitability and proliferation of the 
payday loan industry (Karger, 2005). 
The need for funds becomes apparent to consumers concurrently upon the onset of the 
sudden, unexpected event and the consumers’ realization that they have insufficient funds 
available to finance the event (Melzer, 2011). In order to finance these events, unbanked (i.e., 
those without bank accounts) and/or unemployed consumers with lower annual incomes can 
present tangible goods in exchange for short-term credit at pawn shops, and banked and 
employed consumers with higher incomes can rely on credit cards or liquidated funds in savings 
accounts (Karger, 2005).  Between those consumer groups lies banked and employed consumers 
with moderate annual incomes, a consumer population that can turn to payday lenders during 
times of credit need (Karger, 2005).  In general, about 50% of the payday loan consumer 
population earns annual incomes between $25,000 and $49,999 (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001). 
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[The findings reported by Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) should be considered with caution 
since the work “was supported, in part, by a grant from the Community Financial Services 
Association of America” (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001, p. iii), the national trade association 
for payday lenders (Community Financial Services Association of America [CFSA], 2012). 
Payday lenders flourish in resource-impoverished communities, and banks flourish in 
resource-rich communities (Graves, 2003).  Others (Gallmeyer & Roberts, 2009) have reported 
that payday loan outlets agglomerate in communities dense with immigrants, individuals self-
identifying with an ethnic minority group, individuals between 18 and 29 years of age or over the 
age of 65, individuals employed in the construction industry, and individuals with an active 
military personnel status.  African American communities were home to three times as many 
payday loan outlets as were white communities, regardless of education levels, income levels, 
unemployment rates, age differences, gender identifications, homeownership status, number of 
homes with children, and urban dwelling neighborhood status (King, Li, Davis, & Ernst, 2005). 
 Legislative responses to the payday lending problem differ by state (e.g., Pendus et al., 
2010).  Prior research suggests that states adopt legislation to reconcile their policy needs with 
their socioeconomic and political attributes (Alm & Rogers, 2011; Berry & Berry, 1999; Miller 
& Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010), a model of policy adoption known as the internal 
determinants model (Berry & Berry, 1999).  This thesis hypothesizes that internal determinants 
of state electorate political ideology and state government political ideology correlate with 
different state legislative responses to the payday lending problem. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review begins with a brief discussion of the impact of payday loan use on a 
consumer’s financial well-being and followed by an in-depth discussion of the payday loan 
lending system and an outline of state-level payday loan legislative responses.  Policy adoption 
models used to predict the spread of policy innovation among the states are then discussed 
(Berry & Berry, 1999).   Next, determinants potentially linked to the spread of payday loan 
policy responses are outlined. The literature review ends with this study’s hypotheses. 
Impact of Payday Loans on Consumers’ Financial Well-Being 
Members of the payday loan consumer group may obtain a payday loan to ease the 
financial shock of unexpected expenses (Karger, 2005; Melzer, 2011; Stegman, 2001). However, 
payday loan use increases a family’s future expense-paying ability (Melzer, 2011).  Specifically, 
a family’s geographical proximity to payday lenders (i.e., families living in counties whose 
geographical center is less than 25 miles to a state in which payday loans can be obtained) 
increased their probability of expense paying difficulty by 25% compared to a 20.3% sample 
average (i.e., families living in counties whose geographical center is greater than 25 miles to a 
state in which payday loans can be obtained) and increased their probability of postponing 
healthcare needs (Melzer, 2011).   
Understanding Payday Loans 
Consumers obtain payday loans for a variety of reasons, and such reasons have been 
organized into three different profiles of payday loan borrowers: the emergency borrower, the 
strategic borrower, and the line-of-credit borrower (Anderson & Jackson, 2010). The emergency 
borrower obtains a payday loan for an acute, unexpected need of funds (i.e., times of 
emergency). Strategic borrowers pay bills that would otherwise be paid late thinking that the 
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interest and fee charges associated with payday loans are lower than those charges associated 
with late bill payments (Anderson & Jackson, 2010).  The line-of-credit borrower obtains 
numerous payday loans over the course of a year to emulate a revolving credit card line-of-credit 
(Anderson & Jackson, 2010). 
Two economic theories predict consumers’ decisions to obtain payday loans (Melzer, 
2011).  Both theories reflect the decisions in accord with the rational choice theory (Melzer, 
2011), the notion that people decide to behave in a manner that will provide the best possible 
outcome for their livelihood (McClennen, 2010). The borrowing to smooth current income or 
consumption shocks theory posits that consumers might seek such expensive short-term credit to 
help reconcile current decreases in income and increases in expenses (Melzer, 2011).  A 
consumer obtains a payday loan in such a case, because the consumer believes it would provide 
more benefit to his or her livelihood than would a failure to make ends meet (Melzer, 2011). The 
forecasting and commitment problems: borrowing costs and future distress theory predicts that 
consumers obtain payday loans if they underestimate or fail to recognize the future interest 
charges associated with such short-term credit (Melzer, 2011).  The consumer believes a decision 
to obtain a payday loan in this instance would maximize their livelihood more positively in the 
present than adversely in the future (Melzer, 2011). 
Examples of economic hardships toward which payday loan funds can be applied include 
health, mortgage, rent, utilities, and food bills (Melzer, 2011).  Sixty-seven percent of payday 
loans in a sample of Arizona borrowers were used to finance living expenses, 23% for an acute 
need of a greater amount of funds (e.g., times of emergency), and the remaining percentage for 
unspecified reasons (Sapir & Uhlich, 2003). 
6 
 
 In the event that a consumer seeks a payday loan, he or she must present to the payday 
lender credentials such as documentation for proof of residence (e.g., a state-issued identification 
card, a home address); proof of employment and income (e.g., paycheck stubs, W-2 Forms, 
checking account statement); and a minimum, continuous source of monthly income (Stegman, 
2007).  Continuous sources of monthly income could include government benefits such as 
unemployment insurance or Social Security (Anderson & Jackson, 2010). Sometimes payday 
loan lenders request personal references with contact information before granting a payday loan 
(Karger, 2005). 
After having submitted their credentials to the lender, the borrower relinquishes a 
postdated check amounting to the sum of the loan principle and associated interest charges 
(Karger, 2005).  In turn, the lender provides the borrower with cash in the amount of the 
principle and retains as collateral the postdated check (Karger, 2005).  Once the payday loan 
contractual period matures, the lender might cash the check and thus profit by retaining the 
difference between the face value of the cashed postdated check and the principle (Karger, 
2005). 
Most payday loan contracts terminate in 2 weeks (Karger, 2005).  Sapir and Uhlich’s 
(2003) study of Arizona payday loan consumers found that 40% of borrowers had repaid their 
payday loans within a 2-week period following origination, 16% within a 3- to 4-week period, 
2% within 5- to 6- weeks, 16% by 7 to 8 weeks, while 14% repaid their payday loans within 9 
weeks. (The remaining 12% of Sapir and Uhlich’s respondents specified no reimbursement 
period.) Further, 33% of payday loans obtained by Sapir and Uhlich’s respondents amounted to 
between $300 and $399, while 7% amounted to a total between $100 and $199, 20% between 
$200 and $299, 9% between $400 and $499, and 24% equaling $500 (Sapir & Uhlich, 2003; note 
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that 2% specified no amounts and that the percentage of the authors’ reported survey responses 
equaled 95%). 
 Interest charges typically amount to approximately $15 for every $100 borrowed 
(Stegman & Farris, 2003).  Fox and Mierzwinski (2001) found that interest charges ranged 
between $10 and $35 for every $100 borrowed.  These fees are often converted to implied annual 
percentage rates (Graves, 2003) for easy comparison to credit card interest charges (Stegman, 
2007).  In a sample of payday loans, the average state-sanctioned implied maximum annual 
percentage rate (APR) was 470% and varied between 182% and 910% (Fox & Mierzwinski, 
2001).  Others (Pendus et al., 2010) found that implied maximum annual percentage rates in 
states that sanctioned payday lending varied between 28% allowable in Ohio to 1,980% 
allowable in Missouri.  Only 63.5% of the nation’s state-level payday loan laws required the 
lender to disclose all fees associated with the loan to the borrower (Pendus et al., 2010). 
 Borrowers encounter several reimbursement alternatives at the maturity of the payday 
loan contract (Karger, 2005).  Ideally, borrowers could allow the previously post-dated check to 
clear their checking account, fulfilling the terms of the payday loan as agreed upon at origination 
(Karger, 2005).  Alternatively, borrowers could allow the loan to enter one of two default 
alternatives: Renewals into subsequent 2-week payday loan maturation periods or submission to 
a collection agency for reimbursement (Ernst et al., 2004; Karger, 2005).  Lenders might use 
their state’s nonsufficient funds collection laws in order to coerce and sue the borrower to 
reimburse triple the amount of the payday loan, should the check written at the loan origination 
prove delinquent (Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001). 
In 2000, the payday lending industry earned $1.4 billion of fees through 41 million 
payday loan transactions (Stephens Inc., as cited in Carr & Schuetz, 2001). Others (Robinson, as 
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cited in Carr & Schuetz, 2001) reported that the payday lending industry earned $2.4 billion of 
fees through 65 million transactions. These fees resulted in the stakeholders of publicly traded 
payday loan companies reaping the rewards from such an industry (Stegman, 2001). The practice 
of renewing payday loans into subsequent payday loan periods fuels the proliferation of and 
profitability within the payday loan industry (Karger, 2005).  To illustrate the point, borrowers 
sometimes cannot fulfill their loan obligations as agreed upon at origination (Fox & 
Mierzwinski, 2001).  In such an instance, borrowers might renew their payday loan contract(s) if 
they do not possess enough available funds to both fulfill the payday loan obligations and 
maintain a proper level of sustenance until the borrower’s next paycheck (Fox & Mierzwinski, 
2001).  Renewals result in exponentially increasing interest and fee charges tacked onto the 
borrower’s composite payday loan debt with each rollover (Graves, 2003), and herein lies the 
profitability and proliferation of the industry (Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001). 
 Payday lenders attribute their profitability to the risk inherent in extending funds to low 
income, credit compromised consumers for whom there are few other means of accessible credit 
(Karger, 2005).  Consumers of higher socioeconomic classes are generally considered to be 
creditworthy and could rely upon and reimburse banking institutions for loan products should an 
acute need arise for credit (Karger, 2005).  The riskiest consumers to whom credit could be 
granted, or the working poor, have been deemed unworthy of credit (Stegman, 2005) and the 
interest and fee charges mitigate the great risk of credit default among this socioeconomic group 
(Karger, 2005). In times of acute financial strain, such consumers utilize payday loans, pawn 
shops, and/or other services within the fringe economy, or alternative financial services (AFS) 
industry (Karger, 2005). 
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Many have suggested that payday loan companies agglomerate in communities dense 
with populations of particular socioeconomic demographics (e.g., Gallmeyer & Roberts, 2009; 
Graves, 2003; King et al., 2005). For instance, Graves (2003) found that payday loan companies 
agglomerated and banks were sparse in resource-impoverished communities, while, conversely, 
banks agglomerated in and payday loan companies were sparse in resource-rich communities 
(Graves, 2003). Gallymeyer and Roberts (2009) found statistically significant mean group 
differences between communities with and without payday lenders with regard to the following 
concepts: people living in poverty, immigrants, consumers from particular ethnic minority 
groups, consumers between 18 and 29 years of age and over age 65, consumers serving as active 
military personnel, and consumers employed in the construction industry.  A three-to-one 
proportion was suggested in terms of the total quantity of payday loan outlets in majority African 
American communities as contrasted to majority white communities (King et al., 2005). 
State Legislative Responses to Payday Lending 
All states and the District of Columbia have either prohibited or regulated payday 
lending, and this industry was found to be prohibited in 12 of the United States and in the 
District of Columbia and legal in 38 states (Pendus et al., 2010). State payday loan statutes of 
those 38 states were written such that 33 imposed maximum dollar amounts for payday loans, 33 
set interest charges on 2-week payday loans amounting to an implied maximum annual 
percentage rate, 20 imposed a minimum payday loan term (i.e., number of days from origination 
to maturity), 29 imposed a maximum payday loan term (i.e., number of days from origination to 
maturity), and 33 required payday lenders to fully disclose all fees to the borrowers (Pendus et 
al., 2010).  Anderson and Jackson (2010) reported that Florida’s payday loan statute allowed for 
a maximum number of payday loans a borrower could concurrently have outstanding. 
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Prohibition of Payday Lending. The practice of granting payday loans was banned in 
12 states and in the District of Colombia (Pendus et al., 2010).  Those states were Connecticut, 
Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as well as the District of Colombia 
(Pendus et al., 2010).  North Carolina was the first state in the nation to prohibit payday lending 
(Center for Responsible Lending [CRL], 2010a, 2010b) citing its preexisting delinquent check 
legislation as precluding payday lending on the basis that it was illegal to willfully post-date 
checks for funds presently not had (Moss, 2000; Stegman, 2007). 
Regulation of Payday Lending. The purpose of this section is to delineate and define 
components of state payday loan regulation legislation of the remaining 38 states in which such 
credit practices were sanctioned and regulated (Pendus et al., 2010).  Components discussed 
hereafter include the maximum payday loan principle amounts, the implied maximum annual 
percentage rate, the minimum and maximum payday loan terms, and the disclosure of payday 
loan fees. 
Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts. Maximum payday loan principle amounts 
were the largest amount of funds that a lender could extend to a borrower for a payday loan 
(Stegman & Fairs, 2003).  When written into state payday loan legislation, such maximums were 
specified as explicit dollar amounts that payday loan principles cannot exceed (Pendus et al., 
2010).  For instance, Louisiana stipulated that payday loan principle amounts in that state not 
exceed $350 (Pendus et al., 2010). 
Each state that regulates payday lending determines its maximum payday loan principle 
amounts (Graves & Peterson, 2005). The lowest reported maximum payday loan principle 
amount was $300 imposed by California’s and Montana’s state laws, while the highest maximum 
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loan principle amount written into legislation was $700 in the state of Washington (Pendus et al., 
2010).  Some states base the maximum payday loan principle amounts on borrower income.  For 
instance, Nevada and New Mexico state payday loan legislation allowed borrowers to obtain 
payday loans of no greater than 25% of their gross monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010).  
Finally, the state of Oregon was reported to allow borrowers earning a net annual income of no 
more than $60,000 to seek payday loans for a maximum no greater than 25% of their net 
monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010).  The average maximum payday loan principle amount 
allowed by state law was $484.17 (computed by author using data from Pendus et al., 2010). 
Graves and Peterson (2005) opined that consumer protection is fostered by larger 
maximum payday loan principle amounts than by smaller maximum payday loan principle 
amounts.  Specifically, to obtain larger fund amounts, consumers can pay lower amounts of 
origination fees if state payday loan legislation allows them to obtain one larger payday loan 
than multiple smaller payday loans, although the interest charges may differ (Graves & Peterson, 
2005).  Larger maximum payday loan principle amounts allow consumers to borrow greater 
amounts of funds with a single payday loan, while smaller maximum payday loan principle 
amounts could necessitate multiple payday loans for larger fund amounts (Graves & Peterson, 
2005).  Payday lenders charge various fees with each payday loan origination (Graves & 
Peterson, 2005; Karger, 2005). Thus, larger maximum payday loan principle amounts can allow 
consumers to borrow larger fund amounts with a single origination fee occurrence (Graves & 
Peterson, 2005). Conversely, consumers may have to obtain multiple payday loans for larger 
fund amounts, exposing them duplicative origination fee occurrences (Graves & Peterson, 2005). 
Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rate. The implied maximum annual percentage 
rate of a payday loan is calculated by “annualizing the short-term cost” of the payday loan 
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(Anderson & Jackson, 2010, p. 154).  Three pieces of information must be known before the 
implied maximum annual percentage rate of a payday loan can be calculated: (1) the amount of 
funds the consumer wishes to borrow, usually the maximum payday loan principle amount (e.g., 
$350); (2) the dollar amount of the total finance charge to obtain the payday loan, usually the 
sum of the fees charged per $100 borrowed (e.g., $50); and (3) maturity term of the payday loan, 
usually the maximum payday loan term (e.g., 14 days; Arkansans Against Abusive Payday 
Lending [AAAPL], 2006). 
Upon gathering the aforementioned three pieces of information, the implied maximum 
annual percentage rate can be calculated in four steps (AAAPL, 2006).  The first step is to divide 
the total finance charge (numerator) by the maximum payday loan principle (denominator; i.e., 
$50/$350 = 0.14; AAAPL, 2006).  The next step is to multiply that answer by 365, or the number 
of days in a year (i.e., 0.14*365 = 52.14; AAAPL, 2006).  The third step is to divide such that 
that product is the numerator and the maximum payday loan term is the denominator (i.e., 
52.14/14 days = 3.72; AAAPL, 2006).  The final step is to convert that answer into a percentage 
by moving the decimal place in that answer two places to the right (i.e., 3.72 becomes 372.45%); 
thus, the implied maximum annual percentage rate on a $350, 14-day payday loan with a $50 
total finance charge is 372.445% (AAAPL, 2006). 
The simple method for consumers to calculate the dollar amount of the interest charges 
of a single two-week payday loan rolled-over once (i.e., extended for an additional two weeks) is 
to double the interest charged for the first two weeks of the payday loan contract (Martin, 2009). 
Presumably, this is the amount of interest charged in a month (i.e., a month is typically four 
weeks, or two two-week periods). It follows, then, that the interest charges over the course of a 
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year can be calculated by multiplying the monthly interest charges by 12 (i.e., there are 12 
months in a year). 
In states that regulated annual percentage rates, the implied maximum annual percentage 
rate allowed by state law was 28% in Ohio and the highest was 1,980% in Missouri (Pendus et 
al., 2010).  The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL; 2009) opined that states should 
implement an implied maximum annual percentage rate of 36% or less and argued that “a two-
digit interest rate cap is already saving [borrowers in] the 15 states and the District of Columbia 
which enforce such a cap nearly $2 billion” (p. 2). 
Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Term. Some states also mandated that payday loan 
terms not exceed a particular quantity of days (Pendus et al., 2010).  The shortest maximum 
payday loan maturity term written in state payday loan legislation was 30 days in Minnesota and 
the longest was183 days in North Dakota (Pendus et al., 2010). 
The CRL (2010a, 2010b) recommended that legislators consider longer maximum 
payday loan maturity terms for payday loan legislation, because this allows borrowers more time 
to repay without incurring penalties.  Since borrowers might have difficulty in concurrently 
maintaining a livelihood and reimbursing their payday loan with their first post-payday loan 
maturity paycheck (CRL, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001), three to twelve months 
provides enough time for borrowers to repay their payday loan and make ends meet (CRL, 
2010a, 2010b). 
Fee Disclosure Requirements. Fee disclosure requirements refer to the act of the payday 
lender informing the payday loan borrower of the costs, benefits, and risks of obtaining a payday 
loan (Bertrand & Morse, 2011).  Empirical research has suggested that payday loan borrowing 
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decreases by 11% after disclosing payday loan fees to the payday loan borrower (Bertrand & 
Morse, 2011).    
Policy Adoption Models 
 The diffusion of innovation and the internal determinants models serve as two insightful 
theories that predict state legislative policy adoption attributes for the purpose of the present 
thesis (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969). The former model examines the numerical order or 
clustering of states in regards to the spread of policy trends among the states (Berry & Berry, 
1999). The latter model examines the multiple links between a state’s propensity, or statistical 
likelihood, to adopt a particular policy and that state’s socioeconomic and political attributes 
(Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969). 
 The concepts of innovation and invention must be differentiated before the two policy 
adoption models can be discussed (Mohr, 1969).  An innovation is the novel application of 
preexisting means—a policy, for the purpose of the present work—to the solution of a problem, 
whereas an invention is the creation of means as a solution (Mohr, 1969).   Innovations refer to 
new applications to problems, while inventions refer to new products (Mohr, 1969). 
Diffusion of Innovation Model. The diffusion of innovation model predicts the manner 
in which states emulate policy ideas of other states (Berry & Berry, 1999).  Clusters of states 
generally rank among the first and among the last in the emulation and adoption of policy ideas 
(Berry & Berry, 1999). Such clusters result in a logical order of states in regards to the spread of 
policy innovations (Berry & Berry, 1999). States adopt policy ideas that other states have 
adopted for one or more of three reasons: (1) the policy idea has demonstrated effectiveness in 
adoptive states, (2) states rival and compete against the other states and sense a need to adopt a 
particular policy in order to compete or maintain superiority over the other states, and (3) public 
15 
 
officials of one state may succumb to public pressure in regards to implementing another state’s 
socially desirable, effective policy (Berry & Berry, 1999).  
In summary, the diffusion of innovation model accounts for the general order in which 
states adopt particular policy ideas rather than the characteristics of these states (Berry & Berry, 
1999).  In contrast, the internal determinants model accounts for the prediction of attributes of 
states that adopt particular policy components (Berry & Berry, 1999) and thus serves as the 
policy adoption model for the present cross-sectional analysis. 
Internal Determinants Model. The internal determinants model predicts innovation as a 
reconciliation between an organization’s environmental (i.e., external) attributes and its inherent 
(i.e., internal) attributes (Mohr, 1969). An organization may encounter an environmental problem 
and move to remedy it by applying preexisting means (Mohr, 1969). An organization’s internal 
attributes preclude its ability to innovate: Innovation can occur if the organization has the 
internal attributes, or capacity, to implement and maintain the innovation and vice versa (Mohr, 
1969). Predictors of an organization’s ability to innovate include its resources, size, wealth, and 
ideology and opinions (Mohr, 1969). 
As for states responding to social problems, an innovation reconciles the states’ policy 
response to the problem and their political and socioeconomic attributes (Berry & Berry, 1999).  
States have the capacity to implement and maintain a policy innovation as a result of their 
socioeconomic and political characteristics (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969).  For instance, 
political ideology in the form of citizen liberalism was found to be a strong, significant internal 
determinant of states’ decisions to implement environmental initiatives (Matisoff, 2008). 
Policy innovation serves as the conceptual dependent variable of most studies using the 
internal determinants model (Berry & Berry, 1999).  As such, policy innovation can be 
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conceptualized as either the degree of earliness or the propensity that a state adopts a policy 
(Berry & Berry, 1999). 
 Earliness of Policy Adoption. The degree of earliness of policy adoption by the states has 
been studied in the literature of three ways (Berry & Berry, 1999).  The latency, or quantity, of 
years between a state’s adoption of a policy and the year of the first state’s policy adoption 
represents earliness of policy adoption as an interval-level measure (Berry & Berry, 1999).  The 
numerical rank order in which states adopted a particular policy represents earliness of policy 
adoption as an ordinal-level measure (Berry & Berry, 1999). Finally, Berry and Berry (1999) 
cited some works that have represented state policy adoption as the categorical presence or 
absence of a state’s adoption of a policy at a particular point in time. 
Propensity of Policy Adoption. The propensity of a state to adopt a particular policy can 
also indicate policy innovation and refers to the probability that a state will adopt a particular 
policy within a given timeframe of years (Berry & Berry, 1999). 
State Determinants 
 The internal determinants model of state policy adoption posits that each state adopts 
policies based on its political and socioeconomic attributes (Berry & Berry, 1999). 
Political Determinants. Political ideology, or the political values and beliefs of the 
voting-eligible citizens of a state’s population (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 
2010), serves as a valuable political determinant, because liberal or conservative ideologies 
influence policy change based on the worldviews of groups of people identifying as liberal or 
conservative (Grafton & Permaloff, 2008). Policy responses to payday lending are political 
issues (Stegman, 2007), with some groups of people condemning exploitation of the poor and 
other groups valuing unrestricted, free trade (Faller, 2008).  Those of the liberal political 
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ideology generally view government regulation of corporations as appropriate and necessary to 
assure corporate social responsibility, and conservatives generally view such responsibility as a 
hindrance to profitability and rarely as a government responsibility (Walters, 1977).  Both the 
political ideology of state electorates and of state government officials have been used as the unit 
of analysis in previous internal determinants or diffusion of innovation studies (e.g., Miller & 
Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010).  A discussion of both concepts follows. 
State Electorate Political Ideology. Political ideology refers to the general social policy 
views of groups of people within a defined community (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006), 
and the political ideology of each state’s electorate serves as a political determinant in several 
studies (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010). 
 State Government Political Ideology. The political ideology of state governments refers 
to the majority political persuasion of state politicians and is known as government political 
ideology (Erikson et al., 2008). State government political ideology is a concept worth measuring 
independently from state electorate political ideology (Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, & 
Klarner, 2010). It cannot be assumed that an elected official’s political ideology is perfectly 
congruent with his or her electorate’s political ideology (Berry et al., 2010).  In other words, an 
elected official or the media could portray the elected official’s political ideology one way pre-
election, and the elected official’s post-election governing behavior could suggest the same or a 
drastically different political ideology (Berry et al., 2010). 
Summary 
 Payday lenders entice financially strained consumers with a quick and seemingly easy 
credit extension to help consumers make ends meet (e.g., Karger, 2005; Melzer, 2011).  
Consumers reimburse payday lenders with large amounts of interest, typically $15 per $100 of 
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the payday loan principle (Stegman & Faris, 2003). Each state responds to the payday lending 
business through either restrictions or prohibitions of the practice (Pendus et al., 2010). The 
internal determinants model of policy adoption serves as a convenient lens through which to 
examine state legislative responses to various social problems (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 
1969). Political ideology, or identification as either liberal or conservative (e.g., Berry et al., 
2007; Brace et al., 2007), has been studied as a determinant of state legislative responses to 
social problems (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The consequences of payday loans on consumers’ financial health have been argued 
extensively throughout the literature (e.g., Graves, 2003; Graves & Peterson, 2005; Karger, 
2005; Melzer, 2011).  On the other hand, the states’ legislative responses to the payday lending 
problem have not been studied with a nationwide scope. The purpose of this thesis is to 
determine if relationships exist between state electorate and government political ideology and 
states’ legislative responses to payday lending. Thirty-eight states have legislated restrictions or 
regulations on payday lending, while 12 states and the District of Columbia have legislatively 
prohibited the lending practice (Melzer, 2011; Pendus et al., 2010).  Considering that individuals 
with a liberal political ideology rather than a conservative ideology prefer legislating corporate 
social responsibility (Walters, 1977),  the general hypothesis is that liberal political ideology is 
positively correlated with stricter payday loan laws.  In the hypotheses below, the direction of the 
relationship differs depending on the measure of payday loan legislation used (see Chapter 3 for 
operational definitions). 
Larger state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts provide payday loan 
consumers the opportunity to borrow greater amounts of funds with fewer payday loan contracts 
(Graves & Peterson, 2005).  Consequently, such a payday loan regulation component allows 
payday loan consumers fewer opportunities to incur duplicative payday loan origination and 
application fees, and for this reason, larger state legislated maximum payday loan principle 
amounts indicate stricter payday lender regulation law components (Graves & Peterson, 2005).  
Smaller state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates provide for less 
payday loan interest charges that payday loans can accrue, and for this reason, they indicate 
stricter payday lender regulation law components (CRL, 2009). Larger state legislated maximum 
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payday loan maturity terms provide longer periods of time for payday loan consumers to 
simultaneously reimburse their loans and use their subsequent post-payday loan origination 
paychecks to maintain a minimum standard of living, and for this reason, they indicate stricter 
payday lender law components (CRL, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001). Fee disclosure 
requirements mandated by each state’s payday loan law helps consumers determine the costs of 
the payday loan they are about to obtain, and for this reason, they indicate stricter payday lender 
law components (Bertrand & Morse, 2011). 
H1 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts Hypotheses 
H1.1 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated 
with state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts. 
H1.2 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively 
correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts. 
H1.3 State government political ideology scores (hereafter, GI; higher scores indicate greater 
liberal political ideology) are positively correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan 
principle amounts. 
H2 State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates Hypotheses 
 H2.1 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is negatively correlated 
with state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates. 
H2.2 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is positively 
correlated with state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates. 
H2.3 State government political ideology scores are negatively correlated with state legislated 
payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates.  
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H3  State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms Hypotheses 
H3.1 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated 
with state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms. 
H3.2 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively 
correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms. 
H3.3 State government political ideology scores are positively correlated with state legislated 
maximum payday loan maturity terms. 
H4  Fee Disclosure Requirements Hypotheses 
H4.1 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated 
with the presence of fee disclosure requirements.  
H4.2 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively 
correlated with the presence of fee disclosure requirements. 
H4.3 State government political ideology scores are positively correlated with the presence of 
fee disclosure requirements. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
 The present study utilized a cross-sectional design using secondary data obtained from 
numerous websites (all data sources are cited within the References list); thus, exemption by the 
Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board was granted. 
Dependent Variables 
 Three ratio-level and one nominal-level dependent variables (i.e., state legislated 
maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual 
percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, and a fee disclosure 
requirement) comprised the dependent variable category of type of state payday loan legislation 
and were derived primarily from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset. (All data decisions regarding 
each of the four dependent variables will be discussed in detail in subsections hereafter.) As a 
prerequisite to the following variable discussions, note that the study consisted of the population 
of states in the United States (50) and the District of Columbia for which data were available.  
 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts. The first ratio-level 
dependent variable was state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, or the highest 
dollar amount for which a payday loan can be granted (Graves & Peterson, 2005; Pendus et al., 
2010). All 50 states and the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final 
sample consisted of 45 jurisdictions (i.e., 44 states and the District of Columbia). Pendus et al. 
(2010) provided 30 specific state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, two (i.e., 
Nevada and New Mexico) described as 25% of gross monthly income, and one (i.e., Oregon) 
described as 25% net monthly income for ≤$60K net yearly income, no limit for higher earner.  
The Pendus et al. (2010) dataset provided no state legislated maximum payday loan principle 
amounts for the five states in which payday lending is regulated but had missing data (i.e., Idaho, 
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Illinois, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; Pendus et al., 2010) and the District of Columbia and the 12 
states in which payday lending has been prohibited (i.e., Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin; Pendus et al., 2010). 
 The final sample consisted of 45 jurisdictions (i.e., 44 states and the District of 
Columbia). Pendus et al. (2010) provided 30 specific state legislated maximum payday loan 
principle amounts, but only 28 of them were included in the final analysis.  Data were present for 
Alaska and Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one of the two 
independent variable data sets. Consequently, both states were excluded in the final analysis. 
(Thus far, n = 28.) 
 The criteria for this variable for the states of Nevada and New Mexico were described in 
the data set as 25% of gross monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010). The procedure described 
herein was used to calculate the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts for 
both states using data from the American Community Survey. First, the per-capita income for 
Nevada (Bureau of the Census, 2005b; 2006b; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b) and New Mexico (Bureau 
of the Census, 2005c; 2006c; 2007c; 2008c; 2009c) were obtained for the years 2005-2009.  
These five years were selected, because the Pendus et al. (2010) data set spanned those years. A 
5-year per-capita income for each state was computed. That figure was divided by 12 months to 
compute a monthly per-capita income, and finally that figure was multiplied by 0.25 to estimate 
the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts for those states. (Thus far, n = 30). 
 The data for Oregon were excluded from the final analysis, because the dataset had listed 
a state legislated maximum payday loan principle amount that depended on one of two options: 
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25% net monthly income for ≤$60K net yearly income, no limit for higher earners (Pendus et al., 
2010). (Thus far, n = 30). 
 Data for this dependent variable were missing from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset and 
were retrieved from Payday Loan Laws (2011c; 2011d; 2011j; 2011k; 2011m) for the states of 
Idaho, Illinois, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. However, the states of Texas, Utah, and Wyoming 
have no state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts (Payday Loan Laws, 2011j; 
2011k; 2011m) and were considered missing from the final analysis. Additionally, Illinois’s state 
legislated maximum payday loan principle amount was dependent upon one of two options: 
$1000 or 25% of the consumer's monthly income (Payday Loan Laws, 2011d).  Thus, the 5-year 
average per-capita monthly income for Illinois (Bureau of the Census, 2005a; 2006a; 2007a; 
2008a; 2009a) was calculated in the manner it was for Nevada and New Mexico.  That amount 
was used as Illinois’s state legislated maximum payday loan principle amount, as it was less than 
$1,000 (i.e., $573.72; Payday Loan Laws, 2011d; Thus far, n = 32). 
 Finally, a value of 0 was assigned for this variable to each of the 12 states and the District 
of Columbia in which payday lending was prohibited, since in this context, prohibition means 
that the highest amount of funds for which a payday loan can be granted is $0. (Thus far, n = 45). 
 Six states (Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming) were treated as missing 
for this dependent variable.  All state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts can be 
found in the column maximum loan amount within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for 
2005-2009 Period by State of Pendus et al. (2010). 
 State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. The 
ratio-level dependent variable state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage 
rates were defined as the highest percent of interest a payday lender can charge a payday loan 
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consumer annually and calculated by extending the short-term cost of a 2-week payday loan to a 
year’s time (as mentioned in the earlier literature review; Anderson & Jackson, 2010; Pendus et 
al., 2010). All 50 states and the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final 
sample consisted of 44 jurisdictions (i.e., 43 states and the District of Columbia). 
 Pendus et al. (2010) provided 33 specific state legislated payday loan implied maximum 
annual percentage rates.  The Pendus et al. (2010) dataset provided no state legislated payday 
loan implied maximum annual percentage rates for five states (i.e., Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, 
South Dakota, and Utah) in which payday lending was regulated and the District of Columbia 
and the12 states in which payday lending has been prohibited (i.e., Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin; Pendus et al., 2010). 
 The final sample consisted of 44 jurisdictions (i.e., 43 states and the District of 
Columbia). Thirty-one of the 33 specific state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual 
percentage rates provided by Pendus et al. (2010) were included in the final analysis. Data were 
present for Alaska and Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one of the 
two independent variable data sets. Consequently, both states were excluded in the final analysis. 
(Thus far, n = 31.) 
 Data for this dependent variable were missing from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset and 
were retrieved from Payday Loan Laws (2011b; 2011c; 2011f; 2011i; 2011k) for the states of 
Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, and Utah.  However, none of those states has state 
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates (Payday Loan Laws, 2011b; 
2011c; 2011f; 2011i; 2011k)  and was considered missing from the final analysis. (Thus far, n = 
31).  
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 Finally, a value of 0 was assigned for this variable to the District of Columbia and the 12 
states in which payday lending was prohibited, since the defacto maximum annual percentage 
rate for a payday loan in states that prohibit payday lending is 0. (Thus far, n = 44). Seven states 
(Alaska, Hawaii, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, and Utah) were treated as missing for 
this dependent variable. All state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage 
rates can be found in the column APR Cap Amount, 2007-2009 within Table A.3: Payday Loan 
Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by State of Pendus et al. (2010). 
 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms. The ratio-level dependent 
variable state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms were defined as the maximum 
number of days within a payday loan repayment period (Pendus et al., 2010). All 50 states and 
the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final sample consisted solely of 35 
states (i.e., the District of Columbia was excluded from this particular analysis).  Pendus et al. 
(2010) provided 26 specific state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms for states that 
had regulated payday lending and 3 that had prohibited it.  The remaining 22 states consisted of 
missing state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms data: 12 of states that had 
regulated payday lending and 10 (i.e., 9 states and the District of Columbia) that had prohibited it 
(Pendus et al., 2010). 
 The final sample consisted solely of 35 states (i.e., the District of Columbia was excluded 
from this particular analysis).  Twenty-five of the 26 specific state legislated maximum payday 
loan maturity terms for states that had regulated payday lending were included in the final 
analysis.  Data were present for Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one 
of the two independent variable data sets. Consequently, Hawaii was excluded in the final 
analysis. The three specific state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms for states that 
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had prohibited payday lending (i.e., Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Wisconsin; Pendus et 
al., 2010) were also excluded from the final analysis. (Thus far, n = 25). 
 Missing data for the 12 states (i.e., Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) that had 
regulated payday lending were retrieved from National Conference of State Legislators (2011) 
for New Hampshire and Ohio, and from Payday Loan Laws (2011a; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e; 
2011g; 2011h; 2011j; 2011l; 2011m) for the remaining states. Wyoming’s legislated maximum 
payday loan maturity term was conceptually defined as one month (Payday Loan Laws, 2011m).  
Thus, it was operationalized as 31 days for the present analysis.  Furthermore, Alaska was coded 
as missing to maintain consistency with the variable decisions of the previous two dependent 
variables. The state of Arizona has no state legislated maximum payday loan maturity term 
(Payday Loan Laws, 2011a), so it was excluded as well. (Thus far, n = 35). 
 Finally, the states that had prohibited payday lending and had missing data for state 
legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms were excluded from the final analysis. (Thus 
far, n = 35). All 16 excluded data points were treated as missing for this dependent variable.  All 
state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms can be found in the column Max Loan 
Period (Days) within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by State of 
Pendus et al. (2010). 
 Fee Disclosure Requirement. The nominal-level dependent variable was a fee 
disclosure requirement, or the presence or absence of a mandate in each state’s payday loan 
legislation for payday lenders to fully disclose the payday loan contract terms, fees, and 
conditions to payday loan consumers (ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(m) and ALA. CODE § 5-18A-
13(f), as cited in Graves & Peterson, 2005; Pendus et al., 2010).  All 50 states and the District of 
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Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final sample consisted solely of 36 states.  
Twelve states and the District of Columbia were excluded from the final analysis, because they 
had prohibited payday lending. Two states (Alaska and Hawaii) had missing data for one of the 
two independent variables. All fee disclosure requirements can be found in the column Fee 
Disclosure Requirement within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by 
State of Pendus et al. (2010). 
Independent Variables 
 This study included two independent variables: One measure of state electorate political 
ideology and one measure of state government political ideology. The CBS/NYT poll’s state 
electorate political ideology data (Wright et al., 2003) were retrieved from Wright’s personal 
website hosted on his institution’s (i.e., Indiana University’s) server.  Berry et al.’s (1998a) 
annual governmental political ideology index data were retrieved from Richard Fording’s 
personal website on his institution’s (i.e., University of Alabama’s) server.  
 State Electorate Political Ideology. The CBS/NYT poll (Wright et al., 1985; 2003) was 
a nationwide telephone survey in which voters identified their political ideology (i.e., 
conservative, moderate, or liberal) by answering the questions, “How would you describe your 
views on most political matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or 
conservative?” (Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1985, p. 471).  Both weighted and unweighted 
percentages for each of the three political ideologies (i.e., conservative, moderate, and liberal) for 
about two-and-a-half decades (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003) were provided in Wright 
et al.’s (2003) dataset. The present study used the unweighted percentages, because the seminal 
article of the CBS/NYT poll of state electorate political ideology percentages (Wright et al., 
1985) advised to use the unweighted percentages to obtain a true, sterile portrayal of the political 
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ideology of a representative sample of each state’s active electorate. The weighted percentages 
represent the political ideology of each state reconciled by education, race, sex, age, and the 
proportion of registered and unregistered voters. Each state’s active electorate, as measured by 
the unweighted state electorate political ideology percentages, determines each state’s 
policymakers and therefore is more congruent with state legislative responses to social issues 
(Wright et al., 1985).  Further, the conservative and liberal unweighted and weighted percentages 
are strongly and positively correlated with one another (respectively for each political ideology, r 
= .85 and .94; Wright et al., 1985). 
 State Government Political Ideology Measure. The Berry et al. state 
government political ideology measure (hereafter referred to as the GI measure; Berry et 
al., 1998b) consists of annual political ideology scores for each state that range from 0 to 
100, with lower scores indicating more conservative ideology  and higher scores 
indicating more liberal ideology (Berry et al., 1998b; Berry et al., 2010). For the present 
analysis, each state’s GI measure score for the year 2003 was used with the exception of 
those from Alaska and Hawaii (Berry et al., 1998a).  Those states were omitted from the 
final analysis, because the data were missing (Berry et al., 2008) as discussed earlier. 
 To calculate the GI measure, the authors began by averaging the Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA, an organization espousing liberal political ideology) and AFL-
CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) ratings of their political ideology 
perceptions of each state’s congressional delegation (Berry et al., 2010). In regard to 
calculating the former measure, the ADA’s Legislative Committee identifies 20 articles 
of legislation of importance to the ADA that both chambers of the United States Congress 
had voted upon in a roll-call vote during the prior Congressional legislative session 
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(ADA, 2008).  Each member of Congress is scored on each of the 20 articles of 
legislation, receiving a score of 5 if the legislators’ vote (i.e., yea or nea) is congruent 
with the ADA’s preference or a score of 0 for both absent votes and votes contradictory 
to the ADA’s preference (ADA, 2008).  The individual scores on each legislator’s 20 
votes are summed to constitute the ADA’s annual measure of members of Congress 
(ADA, 2008). 
 In regard to calculating the latter measure, the AFL-CIO COPE identifies articles 
of legislation of importance to the AFL-CIO that both chambers of the United States 
Congress had voted upon in a roll-call vote during the prior Congressional legislative 
session (Carson & Oppenheimer, 1984; Pohlmann & Crisci, 1982).  These articles of 
legislation represent various topic areas, such as labor relations, civil rights and civil 
liberties, and energy deregulation (Pohlmann & Crisci, 1982).  The COPE measure 
represents the percentage of each Congress member’s votes that are congruent with the 
AFL-CIO’s vote preference (i.e., yea or nea) for these identified articles of legislation of 
importance (Carson & Oppenheimer, 1984). 
 To begin the calculation of the GI measure, the average of the ADA and COPE 
scores are calculated for the mean member of each state’s Congressional delegation 
(Berry et al., 1998b). Those averages are then weighted twice considering each state’s 
governmental situation, once considering the distribution of power of the legislators of 
each chamber of each state’s legislature and once considering the influence exerted by 
each state’s legislature and governor (Berry et al., 1998b). The former weight is a 
proportion that varies among the states based on the quantity of legislators identifying 
with a given political party (hereafter, seats) in order for that party to attain the slightest 
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majority necessary to secure the final voting outcome of legislation in that particular 
chamber (hereafter, power; Berry et al., 1998b). Berry et al (1998b) calculated the GI 
measure multiple times for various combinations of the seats-to-power proportions and 
found high correlations among all trials of each weighted version of the GI measure.  
Because of the high correlations, the authors selected intermediate seats-to-power 
proportion weights of .60 for the majority party to control the final voting outcome of 
legislation in a particular chamber and .40 for the power remaining for the minority party 
(Berry et al., 1998b).   
 The latter weight involves the political influence exerted by each state’s governor 
and legislature (Berry et al., 1998b). The political influence of each state’s governor is 
considered a proxy in the GI measure by weighting each state’s mean ADA/COPE score 
by .50 (Berry et al., 1998b).  Additionally, the political influence of each state’s 
legislature is considered a proxy in the GI measure by weighting the product of each 
state’s mean ADA/COPE score and seats-to-power proportions by .25 for both chambers 
of each state’s legislature (Berry et al., 1998b).  Thus, each state’s final GI measure score 
represents the sum of three products: (1) the political influence (i.e., .50) multiplied by 
the ideology rating of its governor, (2) the political influence (i.e., .25) multiplied by the 
seats-to-power ratio multiplied by the ideology rating of the upper chamber of its 
legislature, and (3) the political influence (i.e., .25) multiplied by the seats-to-power ratio 
multiplied by the ideology rating of the lower chamber of its legislature (Berry et al., 
1998b). 
 The acceptance of the GI measure as a reliable and valid instrument to measure 
state government political ideology is based on four assumptions (Berry et al., 1998b). 
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First, parallel forms reliability exists between the articles of legislation selected by both 
ADA and COPE and was demonstrated by a statistically-significant correlation was 
found between the political ideology scores of both groups (r = .88; Berry et al., 1998b). 
 Second, Berry et al. (1998) argued that the mean ADA and COPE score of a 
state’s Congressional delegation is an appropriate proxy for political ideology of a state’s 
legislature.  Only a few states have in-state lobbyists engaged in the practice of rating 
their state legislatures, and the mean ADA and COPE score strongly correlated with those 
ratings (r = .95).  According to Berry et al. (1998b), that correlation between the two 
measures provides evidence that the political ideology of each state’s Congressional 
delegation serves as an appropriate proxy for the political ideology of each state’s 
legislature. 
 Third, within each state’s legislature, both chambers each presumably hold half of 
the political power of the legislative branch’s distribution of political power of state 
government outcomes (Berry et al., 1998b). The weights of .50 (i.e., the political 
influence of each state’s governor) and .25 (i.e., the political influence of each chamber 
of each state’s legislature) appropriately represent the balance of political influence that 
those components exert in shaping state policy (Berry et al., 1998b).  In other words, the 
governor and the legislature each hold half of the political power of state government 
outcomes (Berry et al., 1998b).   
 Finally, political power of a political party in a state legislative chamber is equal 
for both parties if the number of seats held by both parties is equal (Berry et al., 1998b).  
If the quantity of seats held by both parties is unequal, the party with the majority of seats 
controls approximately 60% of the political influence of that state legislative chamber 
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(Berry et al., 1998b).  The party with the majority of seats has complete control of the 
political influence of that state legislative chamber once it holds 60% of the seats in that 
chamber (Berry et al., 1998b). 
Statistical Procedures 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate inferential statistics were completed in the present 
investigation. Descriptive statistics included frequencies and percentages for the categorical 
variables of states with payday loan lending regulation statutes and those with payday loan 
lending prohibitory statutes.  Central tendency and dispersion statistics were calculated for the 
following ratio-level variables: state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts,  state 
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum 
payday loan maturity terms, the CBS/NYT state electorate political ideology percentages 
(Wright et al., 1985, 2003) for the liberal and conservative state electorate political ideologies, 
and the ADA/COPE state government political ideology scores (Berry et al., 1998b). 
Pearson’s r correlations were performed with and without outliers to determine if a 
relationship exists between state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts; state 
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates; state legislated maximum 
payday loan maturity terms and the independent variables: the CBS/NYT state electorate liberal, 
moderate, and conservative political ideology percentages (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 
2003) and the state government political ideology scores (Berry et al., 2008). Outliers were 
defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
This cross-sectional study of state electorate and state government political ideology and 
state payday loan legislation components yielded mixed results.   
Frequencies and Percentages 
 Dependent Variables. The mean state legislated maximum payday loan principle 
amount was $355.64 (SD = $251.27), followed by means of 340.5% (SD = 348.6%) for state 
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates and 43.34 days (SD = 27.83) 
for state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms. (See Table 1, Descriptive Statistics 
With Outliers). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics With Outliers 
 
 n (%) M (sd) 
1. Maximum Principle Amounts   355.64 (251.27) 
2. Implied Maximum APRs   340.50 (348.58) 
3. Maximum Maturity Terms   43.34 (27.83) 
4. Fee Disclosure Requirements 31 (86.11%)    
5. Liberal Electorate Political Ideology   20.0 (6.46) 
6. Conservative Electorate Political Ideology   34.59 (7.47) 
7. State Government Political Ideology   49.82 (27.58) 
Note: Numbers represent means and standard deviations unless otherwise indicated: % of states 
where condition is met and number. 
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Liberal Political Ideology of State Electorates 
 Liberal political ideology of state electorates was represented in the present analysis as 
percentages of respondents in a telephone survey of each state’s electorate that identified liberal 
as their political ideology. Higher percentages indicate greater levels of each state’s respondents 
identifying as liberal (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003).  Data were used for 48 states and 
the District of Columbia, excluding Alaska and Hawaii as mentioned in an earlier chapter.  The 
mean percentage of political ideology of state electorates that identified as liberal was 20.0% 
(SD = 6.45%) between a minimum of 11.0% and a maximum of 46.3%. 
Conservative Political Ideology of State Electorates 
 Conservative political ideology of state electorates was represented in the present 
analysis as percentages of respondents in a telephone survey of each state’s electorate that 
identified conservative as their political ideology. Higher percentages indicate greater levels of 
each state’s respondents identifying as conservative (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003).  
Data were used for 48 states and the District of Columbia, excluding Alaska and Hawaii as 
mentioned in an earlier chapter.  The mean percentage of state electorates that identified as 
conservative was 34.6% (SD = 7.47%) between a minimum of 7.7% and a maximum of 49.6%.  
Political Ideology of State Governments 
 Political ideology of state governments was represented in the present analysis as a 
weighted proportion of the political ideology of each state’s governor and legislator, with lower 
scores representing greater degrees of conservative political ideology and higher scores 
representing greater degrees of liberal political ideology (Berry et al., 1998b; Berry et al., 2010). 
The mean for this independent variable was 49.82 (SD = 27.58) between a maximum of 92.51 
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and a minimum of 5.25. Data were used for 48 states and excluded for Alaska and Hawaii and 
missing for the District of Columbia as mentioned in chapter 3. 
 Outliers were defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0. Thus, 
three outliers were found in the data set: Missouri’s state legislated payday loan implied 
maximum annual percentage rate (z = 4.70), North Dakota’s state legislated maximum payday 
loan maturity term (z = 5.02), and the District of Columbia’s CBS/NYT liberal state electorate 
political ideology percentage (z = 4.06). 
Bivariate Analyses of State Electorate Political Ideology and State Legislative Responses to 
Payday Lending 
 
 The present analysis studied the relationships of state electorate and government political 
ideology and state legislative responses to payday lending (See Table 2, Correlation Matrix With 
Outliers, and Table 3, Correlation Directions With Outliers) and analyzed the data with and 
without outliers.  The findings without outliers did not vary drastically from the findings with 
outliers.  Outliers were defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0. Thus, 
three outliers were found in the data set: Missouri’s state legislated payday loan implied 
maximum annual percentage rate (z = 4.70), North Dakota’s state legislated maximum payday 
loan maturity term (z = 5.02), and the District of Columbia’s CBS/NYT liberal state electorate 
political ideology percentage (z = 4.06). 
 State Legislated Payday Loan Principle Amounts. State legislated payday loan 
principle amounts and liberal political ideology of state electorates were negatively and 
moderately correlated (r = -.487, p < .01; without outliers, r = -.460, p < .01), and this dependent 
variable and conservative political ideology of state electorates were positively and moderately 
correlated (r = .380, p < .05; without outliers, r = .321, p < .05). Both of these correlations were 
found in the direction opposite of their corresponding hypotheses. Additionally, this dependent 
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variable and liberal state government political ideology were negatively and moderately 
correlated (r = -.329, p < .05; without outliers, r = -.329, p < .05) in the direction opposite of its 
corresponding hypothesis  
State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. State 
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates and liberal political ideology 
of state electorates were negatively and moderately correlated (r = -.322, p < .05; without 
outliers, r = -.350, p < .05) in the expected direction. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between this dependent variable and conservative political ideology of state 
electorates (r = .220, p = .152; without outliers, r = .222, p = .157 ) or liberal state government 
political ideology (r = -.118, p = .453; without outliers, r = -.161, p = .308). 
State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms. There was no statistically 
significant relationship between state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms and liberal 
state electorates (r = -.312, p = .068; without outliers, r = -.151, p = .393), conservative state 
electorates (r = -.038, p = .830; without outliers, r = .192, p = .275), or liberal state government 
political ideology (r = -.153, p = .380; without outliers, r = -.001, p = .996). 
Fee Disclosure Requirements. There was also no statistically significant relationship 
between fee disclosure requirements and liberal political ideology of state electorates (r = -.103, 
p = .551; without outliers, r = -.103, p = .551), conservative political ideology of state electorates 
(r = .018, r = .918; without outliers, r = .018, p = .918), or liberal state government political 
ideology (r = -.105, p = .541; without outliers, r = -.105, p = .541). 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix With Outliers 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Maximum Principle Amounts -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. Implied Maximum APRs .596** -- -- -- -- -- --   
3. Maximum Maturity Terms -.029 -.016 -- -- -- -- -- 
4. Fee Disclosure Requirements .037 -.047 .001 -- -- -- --   
5. Liberal Electorate Ideology  -.487** -.322* -.312 -.103 -- -- -- 
6. Conservative Electorate Ideology  .380* .220 -.038 -.018 -.757** -- -- 
7. State Gov Political Ideology  -.329* -.118 -.153 -.105 .213 -.215 -- 
Some of the correlations between dependent variables and between independent variables were presented in the 
table above but not in the text since these relationships were not the focus of the study. 
* p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
Table 3 
Correlation Directions With Outliers 
 Principle Implied APR Term (Days) Fee Disclosure  
 H Result H Result H Result H Result 
Liberal Electorate Ideology  + -** - -* + - + - 
Conservative Electorate Ideology  - +* + + - - - - 
State Gov Political Ideology  + -* - - + - + - 
Addition symbols (+) represent a positive relationship, while subtraction symbols (-) represent a negative 
relationship. 
* p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This study analyzed the relationship between state electorate and government political 
ideology and their respective states’ legislative responses to payday lending.  State electorate 
political ideology was represented in the present analysis as percentages of each state’s 
respondents in a nationwide survey that responded with liberal or conservative upon being asked 
to identify their political ideology (Wright et al., 1985, 2007).  State government political 
ideology was represented by a government ideology index (GI measure; Berry et al., 1998b).  
Respective states’ legislative responses to payday lending were represented as four variables, 
namely state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday loan 
implied maximum annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity 
terms, and fee disclosure requirements. 
Contributions to the Literature 
 Walters (1977) has discussed the relationship between liberal and conservative political 
ideology and such people’s positions on governmental promotion of corporate social 
responsibility. Generally speaking, people of the liberal political ideology prefer governmental 
promotion of social responsibility and people of the conservative political ideology do not favor 
government involvement (Walters, 1977).  Such a line of thinking guided this analysis’ 
hypotheses. 
 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts.  This study 
hypothesized that the percentage of liberals and conservatives in each state’s electorate would, 
respectively, be positively and negatively correlated with this dependent variable: Graves and 
Peterson (2005) opined that higher state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts 
represent government regulation that benefits payday loan consumers more than smaller ones 
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and, furthermore, liberals favor governmental intervention for corporate social responsibility 
while conservatives prefer for corporations to regulate themselves (Walters, 1977).  Conversely, 
this study found a statistically-significant negative relationship between liberal electorate 
political ideology and this dependent variable and a statistically-significant positive relationship 
between conservative political ideology and this dependent variable. Similarly, state legislated 
maximum payday loan principle amounts and liberal state government political ideology were 
hypothesized as positively related but found to be negatively correlated. 
 The statistically-significant findings opposite of their corresponding hypotheses could 
reflect the difference in opinions between the payday lending literature (Graves & Peterson, 
2005) and legislators’ intuitive decisions made in the statehouse about the consumer-friendliness 
of state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts. State legislators may be either (1) 
unfamiliar with Graves and Peterson’s (2005) opinion and may not intuitively think of the 
consumer friendliness of higher state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, or (2) 
familiar with Graves and Peterson’s opinion and disagree with it. Indeed, it is reasonable that 
people unfamiliar with Graves and Peterson’s (2005) opinion in the payday lending literature 
may think that restricting as much as possible the amount of funds for which a payday loan can 
be granted would benefit consumers more than increasing the amount of funds.  [Upon 
completion of the defense of this thesis, some literature (e.g., Edmiston, 2011; McKernan, 
Ratcliffe, & Kuehn, 2010; Williams, 2011) was located that argued for the consumer benefits of 
decreasing the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts.] 
 State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. Because 
smaller state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates provide more 
benefit to payday loan consumers than do larger ones (CRL, 2009), this study hypothesized and 
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found evidence that the percentage of liberals in each state’s electorate would be negatively 
correlated with this variable.  The results supported that hypothesis, that both variables are 
negatively and moderately correlated.  
Limitations 
 The present analysis has several limitations.  With respect to the design of the present 
analysis, bivariate correlations were used to determine non-causal relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables. In a cross-sectional study, one cannot definitively explain 
an increase or decrease in another; rather, one or more extraneous variable(s) can elicit increases 
or decreases in both variables. Further, spurious causes cannot be accounted or controlled for 
with Pearson’s r correlations.  
 Additionally, some of the dependent variables had unlimited values that could have 
significantly influenced the findings if they were accounted for in some capacity. In the present 
analysis, such unlimited values were treated as missing data and, thus, excluded from the 
analysis. Finally, data were missing or excluded for Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon at one or more 
points within the analysis, potentially biasing the sample and the results. (See the Methods 
chapter for a discussion of the measurements of the dependent variables.) 
 It is also possible that regional aspects of the differences in political ideology influenced 
the results (Williams, 2009).  Regionalism refers to the notion that within-group variation exists 
across geographic regions or areas (Williams, 2009).  Thus, a person identifying with a particular 
political ideology in one region of a country can interpret and execute political ideology 
substantially different from a second person identifying with the same political ideology in a 
region elsewhere in the same country (Williams, 2009). In light of regionalism, perhaps people 
of liberal and conservative political ideologies interpret and execute the reconciliation of their 
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political ideology and legislative responses to payday lending differently between regions of the 
United States of America. 
Future Research 
 Future research should focus on determining the conditions under which states prohibit 
payday lending.  An event history analysis would provide this useful information to help 
policymakers determine the point at which prohibiting the practice comes to fruition. A study of 
this sort could consist of data spanning over more than two decades, since payday lending was 
born in the 1990s (Robinson & Lewis, 1999, as cited in Graves, 2003).  This would yield a large 
number of units consisting of each state in each year for two decades, helping control for 
extraneous causes not accounted for in the present analysis. Future research should also account 
for other internal determinants such as socioeconomic and lobbyist characteristics with each 
state, the diffusion of innovation between states, and external determinants such as the nation’s 
political and policy contexts (Ringquist & Garand, 1999). 
Contributions to the Social Work Literature and to Social Work Practice 
 The significant findings from this analysis provide several contributions to the literature 
and social work practice.  This study provided insight into the relationship between liberal and 
conservative political ideology and state payday loan policy components previously missing 
from the literature. That insight could help social workers interested in state payday loan policy 
change use political ideology as an indicator of legislators who could be appealed to regarding 
particular state payday loan policy components.   
Conclusion 
States respond to payday lending in a number of ways, primarily through increasing or 
decreasing their state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday 
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loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, and state legislated maximum payday loan 
maturity terms (CRL, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001; Graves & Peterson, 2005).  
This thesis found evidence of significance suggestive of the notion that states have varying 
degrees of strictness of payday loan legislation and that strictness has some links to liberal and 
conservative political ideology. 
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